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consciences, sensitive to the stain of moral guilt, seem by a strange perversity to feel the yoke of ignorance easy and the burden of unreason light.

There is much else in the book which, did space permit, might well receive attention. A vigorous and well-reasoned attempt to remove some of the seeming contradictions between self-development and self-surrender calls for no remark, as it has already appeared in these pages. Even better, perhaps, is a bright, compact, and clear chapter on friendship,—a subject which has in modern ethics received too little attention. “Ugly Ducklings” handles a theme of perennial interest to every educator; and “The Causes and Cure of Some Moral Defects” touches, with knowledge and insight, but somewhat too cursorily, the pathology of the subject. Readers will find all these chapters profitable.

It may be needful to add, though it is a graceless thing to find even slight flaws in a good book, that it would be possible, with advantage and without serious recasting, to expunge something of the style which, however appropriate in an address, is best absent in print; that a fine quotation from Matthew Arnold is marred by an inaccuracy; that any trifling philosophical gain that may accrue, especially in a book meant for the general reader, is dearly purchased by such words as “other-conscious,” “other-mind,” “ego-altruism;” that the child as “father to the man” is one of those veteran quotations that had better now be honorably superannuated; and that, pending proof of accomplished fact, “the aid of mathematics as well as philosophy” in the construction of a science of just society is a prospect for which, though not perhaps in the accepted sense of the phrase, we cannot find it in us to be sufficiently grateful. A few trifling imperfections such as these, however, detract but little from the merits of a suggestive and valuable contribution to the theory of education.

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PHILOSOPHIE DER BEFREIUNG DURCH DAS REINE MITTEL. Beiträge zur Pädagogik des Menschengeschlechts. Von Dr. Bruno Wille. Berlin: S. Fischer, 1894. 399 S.

The volume under consideration is an interesting and suggestive work, one worthy the attention of a more extended circle of readers. It is not a book written from books, but is founded upon the author's own experience.

The contents are indicated in the headings of the chapters. Idealism ; My Aim ; The Pure Means ; Individualism ; Individual Appreciations of Means ; The Sword or Physical Authority ; The Rod or Pedagogic Authority ; Absence of Force ; Religious Authority ; Economic Profit ; Political Authority ; Moral Thralldom ; Party Power ; Liberation.

Dr. Wille sets forth "the importance of bearing in mind the concomitant effects of a measure." "Apparent as this truth must be," he says, "yet do people seem utterly blind to it, for in countless instances measures are adopted which cannot fail to be purposeless and ineffectual, if not injurious in their concomitant effects. Such means I denote as 'impure' because their effect is to some extent vitiated by the concomitant results so entirely at variance with the main object. A means can be regarded as 'pure' only when side issues do not affect the main purpose of the measure at all, or only in a proportionately small degree."

The goal towards which Dr. Wille is working is "the free, reasoning being." He therefore classes under pure means, narrowly speaking, or under "*the* pure means" all measures which help us to approach more nearly to this reasoning being, but which do not act so in opposition to liberty and reason as to do more harm than good in the attainment of this important end.

In reference to this aim of his our author criticises various political and social regulations. He objects to the use of punishment in education, and his reflections upon corporal punishment (p. 87) are indeed excellent. His remarks upon "sexual pedagogy" (p. 108 *et seq.*) are also worthy of notice. Dr. Wille was himself for many years the moral head of the large Berlin *Freireligiöse Gemeinde*, and attained great success in this capacity.

Even as our author censures the use of force in education, so does he also condemn its use in the state. Except in a very few instances, the application of violent means is hateful to him. He likewise condemns all imperious authority and governmental tutelage ; in short, all efforts to bring reasonable beings to adopt the line of conduct desired, not by means of argument, but through the adoption of other measures.

Dr. Wille denies that benefits arise from the existence of state power. He says with Prudhon, "Let one individual after another ask of the state, 'What benefits do I receive from you, after all? You lay duties on me, you demand military service of me, subject me to all sorts of vexations, to laws and punishments,—now, what

benefits do you bestow upon me in return?" He thinks that for most persons, the answer would be an eminently unsatisfactory one. Our author does not even hold that the state preserves "order and peace." He says, "any person who, by his own experience, is intimately acquainted with the life of the mass of the people, with their eager, restless toil, their deprivations, the insecurity of existence, the havoc wrought in domestic life, alcoholism, the mental and moral ruin, the want of employment, the vagrancy on the highways, the workhouses, and penal institutions, the professional jealousy, the strikes, the acts of desperation, in short, the whole proletarian hell, will take no part in this idle talk of order and peace; he will rather look upon the condition of the masses as in the highest degree riotous and deplorable."

Little as Dr. Wille favors the existing social order, yet he finds the ideal of the Nationalists or Social-Democrats equally distasteful. He sees in it nothing but a form of state socialism, utterly destructive of all liberty. He criticises the system in detail; for the most part, his arguments consist of the familiar objections raised by the followers of Liberalism, and, to me, many of them seem not to hit Socialism at all. Dr. Wille would preserve "the achievements of Liberalism and give them a further development within the confines of Socialism," and so attain to "a Socialism making for freedom and against authority."

At one time, Dr. Wille was himself an adherent of the Social-Democratic party. It seems that certain personal experiences of his in that party, on the one hand, and the influence of prominent individualists, like Steiner and Nietzsche, on the other, have led him to his present point of view; in my opinion, our author underestimates the difficulties in its way.

As in political affairs the individualistic and socialistic tendencies contend with one another, according to Dr. Wille's point of view, so in his ethics, the egoistic and altruistic tendencies are in a constant state of conflict; for the present the former seems to outweigh the latter,—the bold "Liberty of the Ego" of Max Stiener and the "Law of Might over Right" of Friedrich Nietzsche seem to be triumphant; but since the author, at least so it would seem to me, has not yet definitely taken up his position in regard to these two theories, it is questionable whether his present decision on this point is his final one.

For the student of ethics, the most noteworthy chapter of the book, and at the same time the most expansive one—covering more

than one hundred and fifty pages—is the twelfth, that on Moral Thralldom. In this chapter, our author indulges to excess his inclination to use paradox. He seems not to perceive that the use of paradoxical construction is also an “impure means.” Let me cite some instances. “I set but little value upon conscience, regarding it as belonging to a low grade of morality. The free reasoning being is conscienceless” (p. 103). “Yes, conscience hinders mankind in its development toward perfect reason and liberty. Not conscientiousness leads to the free reasoning being, but—prepare to be shocked, thou moral Philistine—consciencelessness” (p. 243). “Whoever aims to develop the free-reasoning being, looks with contempt upon conscience” (p. 245). “Maxims of morality, commonly looked upon as the good geniuses of human society, are rather ‘spectres,’ the diabolic products of darkness and tyranny.” “All forms of moral bondage, too, must be thrown off; we must free ourselves from the restraint of duty, of conscience” (p. 253). “My aim is a human society free from moral authority, as it should be free from every kind of mastery and dominion, free from the demands of morality, from duty, from the shackles of conscience” (p. 275). “Mankind will look upon this period (the period of moral rule) much as we regard the monkey-stage of our existence” (p. 276).

It was very ill-advised, because misleading, for the author thus to phrase his real meaning. The object of his attack is not conscience, but the *irrational conscience*,—conscience giving decisions without foundation, blindly following prescribed usage. He attacks the positive morality current in society, which, for the most part, is but an expression of class interests, and pleads for an *ideal* morality.

He says, “The impudence with which morality identifies itself with legality and works in the interest of the privileged classes is but too clearly shown in the fact that the capitalist, the speculator, the exploiter of every kind is a man of honor as long as he remains within the bounds of legality” (p. 274).

“Authority makes *demands*, but *gives no reasons* therefor; even folly and depravity may surround themselves with a halo and thus make demands upon us, but it would be difficult to find a justification of their position in reason. The bath of liberty and reason which I recommend to ‘morality’ may serve not only to cleanse it, to remove far from it all slavish impulse, but may also act as an *aqua fortis* to separate the essence of true morality, the really beneficial tendencies, from spurious morality” (p. 277).

"The orthodox moralist does not understand," says our author, "that I do not propose to suppress good impulses, but that my plea is solely for a purification of morality."

And likewise Dr. Wille's frequently passionate polemic against the idea of "the ought," is not meant to be taken absolutely, since he himself gives currency to it more than once. Near the beginning of the book he says,—*e. g.*, "You glory in the intellectual side of man, his ability to reflect the world in his soul; actually or through his understanding to grasp everything having a real existence. And you do so with justice. But do not underestimate another side of our nature, our power to set bounds to the world, to *will* what *ought* to be" (p. 2 *et seq.*).

And again, "If we wish to attack a form of immorality we *ought* not to apply local treatment to the diseased members, to bring to bear upon them legal and moral recriminations, but we should aim to improve the general condition of the whole body, to remove the original cause of the symptoms of disease" (p. 255).

"Moral priestlings!" thus does he stigmatize those who make imperious demands but give no reasons for them, and he claims to have discovered representatives of this tendency in the ethical movements in America as well as in Germany. In this belief he opposes Professor Felix Adler's assertion, that "it is the duty of the teacher of ethics to lay before his pupils the teachings of morality, but not to engage in a discussion of the principles upon which they rest." Dr. Wille holds that in the domain of ethics, as elsewhere, the child's inclination to ask after the why and wherefore should not be suppressed, but should rather be stimulated as a manifestation of growing reason and independence.

With much in this volume we shall find ourselves at variance. This fact, however, in no way alters our opinion as to its value.

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THE ETHICS OF HEGEL. Translated Selections from his "Rechtsphilosophie." With an Introduction by J. Macbride Sterrett, D.D., Professor of Philosophy in the Columbian University, Washington. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1893. Pp. xii., 216.

Professor Sterrett's expository "Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion" have already creditably connected his name with Hegel's. In the present volume (one of the "Ethical Series," edited by Professor Sneath, of Yale) Professor Sterrett undertakes